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BY ED

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18 March 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR-Iraq: [Plans being worked out by Soviet and Iraqi officials to return 500 Kurds to Iraq from the USSR are "well along," according to an Iraqi diplomat in Moscow. At the present time, Moscow and Iraqi Communists appear to be playing down the theme of an independent Kurdish state in favor of joint Kurdish-Arab support for the "progressive" Qasim regime.]

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III. THE WEST

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 West Germany: Chancellor Adenauer has publicly made a sweeping rejection of all plans for limiting or withdrawing armed forces in Central Europe. Despite an appearance of "complete unanimity" in his 12-13 March talks with Macmillan, Adenauer's attack on disengagement is aimed at London; it is also designed to correct any public misinterpretation of Bonn's position.

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IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

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 The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that estimate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):

1. The USSR will not turn over access controls to the GDR in the near future. However, the Soviets continue to carry out measures necessary to a withdrawal of their forces from East Berlin, and the physical transfer of access controls could be accomplished with very little or no advance warning.
2. There are no reliable indications of a Soviet intent in the near future to harass or blockade Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin from the East. However, the Soviets could take such actions with little or no warning.
3. The West Berlin population remains basically calm and believes that if the West stands firm, the USSR will not drive the matter to armed conflict. However,

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some informed West Berliners are concerned over what they consider an apparent lack of Allied unity on what actions should be taken.

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR to Repatriate Kurds to Iraq

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[Plans now being worked out by Soviet and Iraqi officials to return 500 Kurds to Iraq from the USSR are "well along,"]

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[Of this number, about 100 were said to be located in the Moscow area, with the remainder around Tashkent.]

[These Kurds are almost certainly from among those who fled to the USSR following the suppression of the short-lived Kurdish People's Republic which was established with Soviet encouragement in northwestern Iran in late 1945. Individual Kurds, such as Mullah Mustafa Barzani--military leader during the 1945 uprising--have returned to Iraq since Qasim's coup, but this would be the largest group of returnees to date. Soviet authorities can be expected to make an effort to include among the returnees agents and Communist sympathizers.]

[Kurdish responsiveness to bloc and local Communist agitation for an independent state constitutes a potentially useful Soviet instrument for exerting pressure on the countries in which the Kurds reside. However, both Moscow and the Iraqi Communists at present are playing down the theme of an independent Kurdish state in favor of joint Kurdish-Arab support for the "progressive" Qasim regime, probably because of the disruptive effect such subversive activity would have on a pro-bloc Iraq. Furthermore, Mullah Mustafa apparently is satisfied, as are many Kurds, with Qasim's treatment of the Kurdish minority.]

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III. THE WEST

Adenauer Rejects All Disengagement Schemes for Central Europe

Chancellor Adenauer on 16 March rejected outright all plans to reduce or withdraw Western troops from Central Europe on the grounds that such schemes endanger Western security. Writing in a Christian Democratic Union (CDU) publication, he stressed that military solutions were unacceptable unless accompanied by political solutions.

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Adenauer's sharp attack on disengagement is probably aimed at London and may reflect a misunderstanding between him and Macmillan in their talks on 14 March. Despite the public appearance of complete unanimity in the talks, no agreement was reached on the problem of thinning out forces in Central Europe. Adenauer's remarks are probably an effort to counteract the widespread German press comment to the effect that he accepted the British view on relaxing tensions in Central Europe through an inspected "freeze" on military forces followed by reduction.

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(A number of usually firm Adenauer supporters in the Bundestag increasingly feel that some such flexible plan must be worked out as a means of retaining public support in West Germany, and Foreign Minister Brentano is also reported to favor such a tactical move.

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